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Because humankind must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
(Stern, 2007), governments are responsible for making and enforcing
appropriate climate change policies. Carbon dioxide (hereafter, CO2)
emission permit trading is a market-based carbon pollution reduction
scheme that has been implemented by the European Union2 (see,
e.g., Boomsma et al., 2012; Lee and Shih, 2010; Szolgayova et al., 2008;
Chao and Wilson, 1993). Speciﬁcally, in the summer of 2003, the
European Union parliament passed a law to initiate the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (hereafter, EU ETS); since January
2005, Europeans have been trading CO2 emission permits on EU ETS
(Benz and Trück, 2009). In the United States, such a cap-and-trade
system is still under discussion. Wilson et al. (2012) predict that the
U.S. congress may pass a law on the federal-level cap-and-trade system
by 2017 and implement the system by around 2020.
Two types of political uncertainty are related to the creation of such
a market. First, it is uncertain whether and when a cap-and-trade
system will be implemented. Second, as Helm et al. (2003) argue, theetournp@uww.edu
duction tax credits, feed-in tar-
. This is an open access article underex ante commitment of a government to preserve the initial quantity
of emission permits is important to achieving policy goals. Without
strong political commitment, private ﬁrmsmay expect that the govern-
ment will increase the quantity as demand for emission permits
increases. Then, the ﬁrms, which can make a choice between different
carbon-emitting technologies, aremore likely to invest in amore proﬁt-
able resource that might be emitting more CO2, and the government
may fail to accomplish its green policy goal. In economics, such a
problem is called the government credibility problemor the time incon-
sistency problem. In this paper, we study a timely question of how an
investor, who can delay the investment, reacts to the aforementioned
two types of political uncertainties. Speciﬁcally, this paper studies the
decision of an electric utility which can invest in either a relatively
“green” natural gas-ﬁred electric power plant or a relatively “less
green” coal-ﬁred plant as a new incremental base-load resource.3 This
problem is particularly interesting because, according to Szolgayova
et al. (2008), the electricity sector accounts for more than 40% of CO2
emission.
We make four contributions to the literature. First, this article
demonstrates how to extend the real option approach proposed by
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Majd and Pindyck (1987), McDonald and
Siegel (1986), and Brennan and Schwartz (1985) to more realistic3 Likewise, Fleten andNäsäkkälä (2010) consider a natural gas plant as a candidate for a
base-load resource.
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ment policy risk. We implement the least squares Monte Carlo (hereaf-
ter, LSMC) method of Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) because of the
complexity of real option decisions of interest. The value of a power
plant is a strip of spread options because of its operational ﬂexibilities.4
Furthermore, for electric utilities, the real option is a choice between
more than one strip of spread options because a request for proposals
(hereafter, RFP) is solicited to choose among various resources or a
market purchase. While papers such as Fleten and Näsäkkälä’s (2010)
assume an inﬁnite life of a plant to obtain a closed-form solution, we
assume a ﬁnite useful life. Our assumption is more realistic given that
nearing the end of its life, an electric utility will solicit another RFP. To
our knowledge, the LSMC is the only way to model such a complex
compound American option on multiple strips of spread options.
Yang et al. (2008) and Fuss et al. (2008) study the effect of political
uncertainty on power plant investment decision making, and conclude
that a ﬁrm expecting climate policy uncertainty should wait until the
uncertainty is resolved. Differently from them, we explicitly consider
the aforementioned exotic American compound option nature of an
investment opportunity, and ﬁnd that their conclusion of deferring an
investment decision until resolution of political uncertainty may not
always be true. Speciﬁcally, if a green rule is planned for a future
application (e.g., 2020), and the market believes that the probability of
successful implementation is low, ﬁrms will build a “less green” plant
early to beneﬁt from the period before the green rule is applied without
too much exposure to CO2 cost risk.
Our second contribution is to introduce a new type of political
uncertainty—government credibility risk—to a real option study of a
climate change policy and/or political uncertainty. For example,
Maxwell and Davison (2014), Kettunen et al. (2011), Lee and Shih
(2010), Szolgayova et al. (2008), Chao and Wilson (1993), and
Herbelot (1992) analyze real options under various climate policy in-
struments; Boomsma et al. (2012), Nishide and Nomi (2009), Yang
et al. (2008), Fuss et al. (2008), Pawlina and Kort (2005), and Saphores
et al. (2004) increase understanding of political risk in the context of
real options. Our paper differs from the aforementioned papers by in-
cluding government credibility issues which may arise once a policy is
in place.5
Industries affected by a CO2 reduction policy can put pressure on the
government to ease such costs by, for example, hiring a lobbyist and
interviewing with the press, so political uncertainty may be interlinked
to commodity prices. Differently fromBoomsma et al. (2012), whouse a
Markov chain to investigate the effect of policy risk related to feed-in
tariffs and renewable energy certiﬁcates on electric power plant deci-
sions, we model the political pressure on a government as a Brownian
motion, and the submission of government to such pressure as a ﬁrst
passage time, a logical setting in which to study the government credi-
bility problem because of the potential correlation between commodity
prices and the pressure to government. While Pawlina and Kort (2005)
use the ﬁrst passage time of the value of the entire investment project
to study investment under uncertainty and policy change, we use a
separate stochastic process for which the threshold of the ﬁrst passage
time can be easily calibrated.
Third, we shed light on understanding operational ﬂexibility in the
presence of political risk on a climate change policy. We ﬁnd that if
there is no scheduled CO2 emission permit market implementation,
the operational ﬂexibility is almost irrelevant because a coal plant is4 For example, Fleten andNäsäkkälä (2010), and Cartea andGonzález-Pedraz (2012) al-
so model a physical asset as a strip of spread options.
5 Saphores et al. (2004) ﬁnd that a long and uncertain regulatory process can be costly
to theﬁrm. Nishide andNomi (2009)ﬁndpolitical and social instability delays investment,
and right before the regime change, investors behave as if the worst case scenario is as-
sumed. We study different aspects of policy risk: the credibility of a policy and whether
and when a cap-and-trade system will be implemented.more proﬁtable than a natural gas plant in most states of world. In the
presence of a scheduled CO2 emission permit market implementation,
the incremental costs of emission permits make a coal plant less proﬁt-
able than a natural gas plant. In that case, removing the operational ﬂex-
ibility does change the relative economics of these two alternatives,
preventing management to stop production. Thus, the value of waiting
and the time to investment are increased. We ﬁnd that such an effect
of operational ﬂexibility on investment timing matters more when
government credibility risk is high.
Fourth, this paper documents a new channel of additional risk
hastening investment. While government credibility risk delays invest-
ment in power plants under reasonable model parameters, uncertainty
about the future implementation of the policy can actually decrease the
average time to investment. The literature has documented channels
through which additional risk hastens investment. Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1996) document that if an investment lag is greater than zero, the
increase in volatility may incent a ﬁrm to invest earlier because it
decreases the value of abandoning a project. Chronopoulos et al.
(2011) ﬁnd that in an incomplete market, the increase in risk aversion
may decrease the average time to investment. The new channel docu-
mented in this paper is as follows. Uncertainty about the future imple-
mentation of the policy and government credibility issues have two
effects: ﬁrst, both increase the variability of the future cash ﬂows of
ﬁrms, which delays the investment; second, both lead to more positive
cash ﬂows, which accelerates the investment. We ﬁnd that under cer-
tain conditions, the latter effect dominates.
To study the optimal investment decision under the government
credibility problem, we propose two real option analyses. We ﬁrst
study the value of an investment opportunity for a power plant using
a compound exchange option (Carr, 1988) (hereafter, CEO). A ﬁrm
generating electric powermakes a sequence of two separate but related
decisions: The ﬁrst one is whether the ﬁrm invests in physical capital;
and the second one is whether the ﬁrm dispatches the electric power
plant. Because an exchange option (Margrabe, 1978) can model the
second decision, a compound option on an exchange option (CEO) can
model the ﬁrst decision. Calculating CEO premia, we demonstrate that
the emission permit price affects the decision of investing in, or not
investing in, a green resource. However, this simple framework does
not account for the nature of a compound American option on multiple
strips of European spread options. So, we implement the LSMC simula-
tion and provide insight into the value of waiting, the investment
timing, and investment choice that we glean from the LSMC results.6
Within our LSMC simulation, an electric utility has the opportunity
to build a new power plant, which will be connected to the electrical
grid. The power plant will either use coal or natural gas as fuel. Coal
costs less, but emits more CO2. Natural gas costs more, but emits less
CO2. The power-generating company has the opportunity, not the
obligation, to invest in the new power plant. The ﬁrm thus has a real
option.
We summarize the LSMC results as follows: the presence of a
green policy does promote the investment into natural gas plants.
When the policy is implemented immediately, the presence of a
green policy reduces future cash ﬂow by imposing emission costs, re-
ducing the immediate exercise values of the real option. This slows
investment into new power plants. Credibility issues at the govern-
ment level increase the variance of future cash ﬂows and further
slow investment into new power plants. Removing the generation
ﬂexibility reduces the immediate exercise value because the man-
agement cannot stop production in less favorable situations, and
the power plant can incur losses. The lack of generation ﬂexibility
delays the investment timing.6 Our analysis is partlymotivated by Schwartz and Trolle (2008), who study the real op-
tion under expropriation risk.
7 Even if we take the perspective of an electricity-generating company, the payoff
function (2) still holds. In this case, the company generates electricity only if
Et N H × (Ft+M × Pt), because the left-hand side is the per MWh electricity sales revenue
and the right-hand side is the costs for generating 1 MWh of electricity. Then, the proﬁt is
the maximum between 0 and Et − H × (Ft +M × Pt).
8 In reality, H is not a constant because physical heat rate depends on the age of a gen-
erator, temperature, air pressure, and many other variables. However, H is assumed con-
stant for simplicity because the variation of H is small relative to the variation of
electricity (natural gas) price.
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a green policy reduces future cashﬂows beyond 2020 anddelays invest-
ment. Two levels of uncertainty are present. First, it is uncertainwhether
the policy will be implemented. Second, if implemented, it is uncertain
whether the government will maintain the cap on emissions. When in-
dustries are affected by the green policy and their lobbyists can affect
whether the policy will be implemented or not (with a probability R),
the additional variability of future cash ﬂow further delays investment
into new power plants. When the probability of implementing the
policy is lower (e.g., R= 50 %) than R= 100%, the variability of future
cash ﬂows is increased, but the probability of more positive cash ﬂows
is increased and investments aremade sooner. Once the policy is imple-
mented, with reasonable values for the parameters of the government
credibility model, the effect of increased variance of the cash ﬂows
supplants the effect of more positive cash ﬂows. However, when using
extreme values for the model, it is possible to create cases where the
effect of more positive cash ﬂows overrides the effect of increased
variance and effectively hastens investments. Speciﬁcally, we create an
example case where the government would increase the cap on the
emission of CO2 such that the permit prices get divided by 10. In such
circumstances, we were able to observe a case where the increase in
government uncertainty would actually hasten investments.
In this paper, one megawatt-hour (hereafter, MWh) is the delivery
of onemegawatt of electric power for one hour, which is the same as 3.6
gigajoules (hereafter, GJ). The major source of data is provided under
imperial units. Here are the conversion factors: onemillion British ther-
mal units (hereafter, mmbtu) = 1.05587 GJ; fuel costs $1/mmbtu =
$0.947086289/GJ; heat rate 1 mmbtu/MWh = 1.05587 GJ/MWh; CO2
emission 1 lb/mmbtu = 0.429504 kg/GJ; emission cost $1/ton =
$1.102536/ton (metric); and emission amount 1 lb/MWh = 0.4535
kg/MWh.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
documents the real option of an investment opportunity of a power
plant; Section 3 discusses the data; Section 4 reports the numerical
results; and Section 5 provides the conclusion.
2. The real option
Themethodology in this paper assumes the presence of unregulated
wholesale electricity markets, as in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union. Having access to a wholesale
electricity market, an electricity company has an option to dispatch a
plant or to purchase electricity from a wholesale market. Consider the
following simple numerical example. Assume that the wholesale
electricity price is $50 per MWh, the wholesale fuel price is $4.00
per mmbtu, and the heat rate of a generator that the company
owns is 10 mmbtu/MWh. Dispatching the generator costs $40/MWh
(=$4.00/mmbtu * 10 mmbtu/MWh). On the other hand, purchasing
electricity from the wholesale market costs $50/MWh. As dispatching
the generator ($40/MWh) costs less than purchasing electricity from
the wholesale market, a rational ﬁrm chooses to dispatch its generator.
For another example, assume that the wholesale electricity price is
$40/MWh, the wholesale fuel price is $5.00/mmbtu, and the heat rate
of the generator is the same as before. Dispatching the generator then
costs $50/MWh (=$5.00/mmbtu * 10mmbtu/MWh),whereas purchas-
ing electricity from the wholesale market costs only $40/MWh. Then, a
rational ﬁrm chooses to stop running the plant and purchases electricity
from the wholesale market, if the ﬁrm has generation ﬂexibility.
Let us describe a market where there is a cost associated with
the emission of CO2. Let E denote the wholesale electricity price in
$/MWh; F the wholesale fuel price in $/mmbtu; H the heat rate in
mmbtu/MWh; M the emission amount of CO2 (lb/mmbtu); and P the
emission cost ($/lb) of a generator that a ﬁrm owns. Because a ﬁrm’s
optimal decision for a long-lived asset requires information on
commodity prices later than the time of investment, we implement a
forward curve evolution model which captures major features forlong-term asset valuation, including contango/backwardation, the
term structure of volatility, and the long-term growth rate equal to an
interest rate. Speciﬁcally, we model the dynamics of forward curves by
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for i ≠ j ∈ {E, F, P}. As
shown in Appendix A and Fig. 1, this forward curve evolution model
captures forward curve movements to contango/backwardation, and
the long-term resource price growth rate equal to an interest rate.
For one hour electricity generation of a unit capacity of 1 MW, the
electricity cost for an electric utility company,with access to awholesale
market, is given by
εt ¼ min H  Ft þM  Ptð Þ; Etð Þ; I ¼ 1H  Ft þM  Ptð Þ; I ¼ 0

ð1Þ
where Ι=1 for the case that the company has the generation ﬂexibility,
and Ι= 0 when electricity generation cannot be stopped. Because Et is
the electricity cost of a ﬁrm that does not own a generator, we deﬁne
the payoff of owning an electricity generator as
vt ¼ max Et −H  Ft þM  Ptð Þ;0ð Þ; I ¼ 1Et −H  Ft þM  Ptð Þ; I ¼ 0

ð2Þ
which is the incremental reduction in electricity cost by owning a
generator.7 As heat rate H is constant8 and Et, Ft and Pt are random
variables in thewholesalemarket, (2) is the same as the payoff function
of a spread option (a.k.a. an exchange option) when the ﬁrm has gener-
ation ﬂexibility (I= 1).
Alternatively, we may also consider plant availability:
vt ¼ max Et −H  Ft þM  Ptð Þ;0ð Þ½   At ; I ¼ 1Et −H  Ft þM  Ptð Þ½   At ; I ¼ 0

where At=1 if a plant is available for electricity generation and At=0 if
a plant is unavailable, because power generation equipment may be
mechanically unavailable due to scheduled maintenance or a forced
outage at time t. As we will illustrate later, the general conclusions of
this paper do not change even after including an availability factor,
E[At], which is 100% − (scheduled outage rate) − (equivalent forced
outage rate).
Now, let us consider the optimal decision of investing in an electric
power plant. Following Lee and Shih (2010), Nishide and Nomi
11
Fig. 1. Forward curve evolution. Thisﬁgure exempliﬁes plus/minus one standarddeviation
movement of the electricity forward curve. Because of the term structure of volatility, the
movement of relatively near future years is greater than that of relatively far future years.
Observe that +1 SD, which represents upward perturbation of the forward curve by 1
standard deviation, creates backwardation, and−1 SD, which represents downward per-
turbation of the forward curve by 1 standard deviation, leads to contango. Additionally,
observe that the median, which represents no perturbation, is slightly less than the initial
forward curve, which is the same as the expectation, because of the convexity of log-
normally distributed price to a normal perturbation. The movement of natural gas and
emission permit forward curves also exhibit the same pattern.
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others, we consider a risk neutral decision maker. To evaluate the elec-
tric generation plant, the investor will sum the discounted expected
value of future payoffs. The investor uses the forward curves of electric-
ity and fuel prices, and the emission costs to evaluate the electric gener-
ation plant. For the emission costs, we assume that the discounted
emission permit prices are martingale. The forward curve of those per-
mit prices is thus the initial permit price indexed by the interest rate.
The value of the electricity generation plant is given as a strip of ex-
change options:
Vt ¼ ~Et
XtþT
i¼tþ1
exp −r i−tð Þð Þ  vi
" #
ð3Þ
where T is the operating life of the plant; r is the risk free rate9; Ẽ is a risk
neutral expectation.10
The ﬁrm has an option to choose the timing of an irreversible
investment to the best of its economic payoff. The time 0 value of an
investment opportunity for a power plant is given as an American
compound option on a strip of European exchange options. When con-
sidering only one type of power plant, the option can be represented by
C ζð Þt¼0 ¼ supτ~E0 exp −rτð Þ  max 0;V ζð Þτ−K ζð Þτ
  
where ζ is the plant type (coal or natural gas), τ is the optimal invest-
ment time and K(ζ)τ is capital investment at time τ.
Finally, when a ﬁrm can make a choice between a (less green) coal
plant and a (more green) natural gas plant, the value of the investment
opportunity (Ψ), is given as an exotic American compound option on
multiple strips of exchange options:
Ψt¼0 ¼ supτ ~E0 exp −rτð Þ  max
0;
V Coalð Þτ−K Coalð Þτ ;
V N:gasð Þτ−K N:gasð Þτ
2
4
3
5
2
4
3
5
2
4
3
5: ð4Þ9 For simplicity of notation, we assume a constant interest rate.
10 Subsection 4.2 proposes a simpliﬁed version where the decisions to dispatch are
grouped at the average dispatch time weighted by the time value of money.To solve (4) we use an LSMC method. Eq. (4) can be represented
recursively by
Ψt ¼ ~Et exp −rð Þ  max
0;
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V N:gasð Þt−K N:gasð Þt ;
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The LSMCmethod provides the optimal stopping time τ, the optimal
type of power plant, and other auxiliary variables.
2.1. Least squares Monte Carlo method
We evaluate the exotic compound exchange option in (5) using the
LSMC method because, as the remainder of this section will elaborate,
our model involves multiple state variables, and the LSMC method is
less plagued by the curse of dimensionality than trees and lattices.
First, we simulate the evolution of an electricity forward curve E(t, T'),
a fuel forward curve F(t, T'), and an emission permit forward curve
P(t, T') where t ≥ 0 is the trading time and T' ≥ t is the delivery time of
a commodity (see (A.1) in Appendix A).11 Second, at the terminal
nodes, the exercise value is computed for each type of plant using
(3).12 Third,working backward, the algorithm compares non-zero exer-
cise values with the holding value of the option, as in (5). The holding
value is estimated from the ordinary least squares (OLS) with a set of
basis functions applied to the state variables. Following Schwartz and
Trolle (2008), we select simple monomials as basis functions, and
choose a constant, an electricity price, a fuel price, and an emission
permit price as state variables and use the complete set of polynomials
up to order two.13 As we will illustrate later, we use zero coal volatility
as the main scenario—in such a case, coal’s price is not included as a
state variable. However, we also consider a robustness test where we
use a 10% annualized volatility for coal—in this robustness test case,
coal’s price is included among the state variables. The LSMC algorithm
not only calculates the option value, but also gathers auxiliary informa-
tion, such as which investment decision a holder of (5) will make in
each simulated path; when such a decision is made; and when the
plant is dispatched or not.
2.2. Political uncertainty
A government has the opportunity to implement an emission trading
system. When such a policy is adopted, the emission permit prices are
modeled using the forward curves evolution documented in Appendix
A; when the policy is not adopted, the emission permit price is set to
zero.More precisely,with probability R, an emission permit price follows
(A.1); andwith (100%− R), an emission permit price is zero. Tomodel a
government thatwill implement the cap-and-trade systemwith certain-
ty, we use R=100%; tomodel some uncertainty in the implementation,
we use R b 100 %. This probability of implementation is useful when
considering cases where the policy is to be implemented in the future.
To account for the government credibility problem (a.k.a. the
government time-inconsistency problem), we take a reduced-form
approach. The electricity sector’s and other industries’ pressure on the
government must come from high emission permit prices. To ensure
that the model presents such a feature, we present a general model
for the political pressure as
dPRESt ≡ μPRES tð Þdt þ σPRES tð ÞdWP tð Þ and
δ ≡min t N 0jPRESt ≥ CREDf g ð6ÞThe emission permit prices are subject to political pressure, which is described in the
following subsection.
12 Considering the typical operating life of an electric power plant and amanager’s career
length, we assume a thirty-year investment horizon.
13 The results presented are robust to various combinations of higher-order polynomials.
Table 1
Physical characteristics and capital costs. This table summarizes the physical characteris-
tics of electric power plants for our economic analyses. These data are from PaciﬁCorp’s
integrated resource plan (PaciﬁCorp, 2007).
Plant Coal Plant Natural Gas Plant
Details An integrated gasiﬁcation combined
turbine with minimum carbon
preparation and level II control (IGCC)
A water-cooled combined
cycle combustion turbine
(CCCT)
Heat rate 8.732 mmbtu/MWh 7.223 mmbtu/MWh
CO2 emission 205.35 lb/mmbtu 118.00 lb/mmbtu
Capital cost $2,479 per kilowatt $895 per kilowatt
100 S.B. Kang, P. Létourneau / Energy Economics 54 (2016) 96–107where μPRES(t) is a drift in the pressure process; σPRES(t) is the volatility
of the pressure; WP(t) is the Brownian motion driving the emission
permit price variations; PRESt represents political pressure to a govern-
ment; CRED N 0 represents resistance of a government to the pressure; δ
is the ﬁrst passage of time representing the time required for the
government to take a new decision regarding the carbon pollution
reduction scheme; and PRESt is reset to zero at time δ.
In our current analysis, we select μPRES(t) = 0 and σPRES(t) = 1,
i.e., PRESt =WP(t), because this process is simple and parsimonious,
but still can ﬂexibly model government credibility. A “good” (credi-
ble; time-consistent) government is modeled as one with high
CRED, whereas a “bad” (not credible; time-inconsistent) government
is modeled as one with low CRED. Because PRESt follows a simple
Brownian motion, CRED can be easily calibrated from a rational
ﬁrm’s belief on how credible its government is—if p is the ﬁrm’s be-
lief of the probability that the government will increase the number
of permits for the next year, CRED is calibrated as CRED =
Φ−1(100 %− p) whereΦ−1(⋅) is the inverse cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution. For example, if p =
30 %, CRED = 0.5244; if p = 15.87 %, CRED = 1. Furthermore,
CRED = 1 leads to an average of 2.24 government submissions over
a period of 30 years, while CRED = 0.1 leads to an average of 4.76
government submissions over a period of 30 years. If CRED = ∞,
such an extremely credible government never gives in to any politi-
cal pressure—in Section 4, we use CRED = 1,000 as a proxy for
CRED = ∞.14
Upon the ﬁrst passage time, WP(t) and PRESt are reset to zero,
and it is assumed that the government issues new emission permits
in order to bring back the price to its expected value of $35 per ton
indexed by the interest rate. The rationale is that once a govern-
ment increases the number of permits, the pressure on the govern-
ment disappears. PRESt then evolves toward the next ﬁrst passage
time. In other words, several submissions of a government are pos-
sible during a ﬁnite time horizon. This model ensures the govern-
ment submission will only occur when emission permit prices are
high.15
Our modeling approach relies on an important premise: A ratio-
nal company forms its beliefs about government credibility (CRED)
and policy risk (R). We believe that this assumption is plausible
because of the following reasons. Private ﬁrms gather various in-
formation from public news, private intelligence, their analysts,
and consultants, etc., regarding how credible a government is.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the ﬁrms’ management han-
dles this information and forms a belief about government
credibility.
It is worth mentioning that a ﬁrm does not have to form its single
“best” belief on CRED or R: A ﬁrm can run our model multiple times
for various scenarios of CRED and R in order to evaluate the best
strategy corresponding to each scenario. However, a rational ﬁrm
should have a “base case” scenario for its baseline business planning
purposes.16 Among a battery of coal and natural gas plants that PaciﬁCorp (2007) considers as a3. Data
To study how government time-inconsistency affects investment
choice and investment timing, we consider a relatively “greener”
natural gas electric generation plant versus a relatively “less-green”
coal plant. The physical and economic data of each plant are from the
Integrated Resource Plan (hereafter, PaciﬁCorp, 2007) that PaciﬁCorp,14 These probabilities and submission counts were estimated using 1,000,000
simulations.
15 A Poisson process, even with variable intensity, could produce government submis-
sion while the emission permit prices are low, which is not desirable.a multi-billion dollar electric power utility, serving six western states
in the United States, ﬁled to the Oregon Public Utility Commission.16
Table 1 summarizes thephysical characteristics and cost information
of the coal plant and the natural gas plant. The physical heat rate of the
selected coal plant (8.732 mmbtu/MWh) is less favorable than that of
the selected natural gas plant (7.223 mmbtu/MWh). The CO2 emission
of the coal plant (205.35 lb/mmbtu) is also less favorable than that of
the natural gas plant (118.00 lb/mmbtu). Finally, the capital cost of
the coal plant ($2,479 per kilowatt) is less favorable than that of the
natural gas plant ($895 per kilowatt).
Table 2 documents the forward curves, volatility curves, and correla-
tion curves thatwe use in later sections; these are calibrated against ﬁve
years (2008–2013) of historical data we gather from Bloomberg. We
calibrate the electricity forward curve and volatility curve against daily
historical data for SP15 spot and forward prices. The initial electricity
forward curve starts from $51.8195/MWh in year 1, calibrated from
next calendar year contracts, and is indexed by the interest rate. This is
due to the electricity market forward curve being in a contango shape
in 87.35% of trading days between 2008 and 2013. However, as Fig. 1
depicts, this initial contango shape may change to a backwardation
shape as time goes on. Fromhistorical spot and forward prices of various
maturities,we calculate the average volatility to estimate the term struc-
ture of electricity volatility: the electricity average volatility curve starts
from 0.5862 in year 1 and exhibits a backwardation shape, which is
often termed the “Samuelson effect” (Samuelson, 1965). Similarly, our
natural gas forward curve and volatility curve are calibrated with
Henry Hub natural gas spot and forward prices. The initial natural gas
forward curve starts from $4.7806/mmbtu in year 1, calibrated from
NYMEX rolling month 12 contracts, and is indexed by the interest rate.
This is due to the natural gas market forward curve being in a contango
shape in 98.31% of times. The natural gas volatility curve starts from
0.4790 in year 1 and is also backwardated. The same two sets of data
are used to calculate the curve of correlation between electricity and
natural gas. The electricity–natural gas correlation curve starts from
0.6386 in year 1 and is in a contango shape.
Using insights from Ayres andWalter (1991) and PaciﬁCorp (2007),
we use $35 per ton or $0.0175 per pound as an estimate for an emission
permit price and index it with the interest rate. As mentioned in the
Introduction, U.S. federal-level emission trading has yet to begin so cur-
rent CO2 emission permit price data are not available for the volatility
and correlation estimation. Instead, we use 5 years (2008–2013) of his-
torical data of EU ETS emission permit prices and German electricity
(Netherlandsnatural gas) spot and forward prices as proxies to estimate
emission permit price volatility and correlation. We believe these to be
reasonable proxies because in both the U.S. and the E.U., electricity and
natural gas are commoditized, and natural gas is often themarginal fuelcandidate of its new resource, our choice is an integrated gasiﬁcation combined turbine
(hereafter, IGCC) with minimum carbon preparation and level II control as the example
coal plant, and a water-cooled combined cycle combustion turbine (hereafter, CCCT) as
our sample natural gas plant. We choose the IGCC because it is the most “green” among
the coal plants in PaciﬁCorp (2007); given the current public awareness of air pollution,
the choice of other “traditional” coal plants may lead to deterioration in public relations.
We choose the CCCT because it is the typical design of a new natural gas power generator.
Table 2
Simple economics without the real option approach. Panel A (panel B) reports the fuel costs plus the capital cost for generating 1 MWh of electricity from each power plant assuming no
($35/ton) emission cost.
Plant Coal Plant Natural Gas Plant
Panel A: Assuming no emission permit cost
Fuel price $0.50/mmbtu $4.78/mmbtu
Fuel cost $4.37/MWh(=8.732 mmbtu/MWh * $0.50/mmbtu) $34.53/MWh(=7.223 mmbtu/MWh * 4.78/mmbtu)
Capital cost* $36.06/MWh $19.18/MWh
Cost per MWh $40.43/MWh(=$4.37/MWh +36.06/MWh) $53.71/MWh(=$34.53/MWh + 19.18/MWh)
Panel B: Assuming $35/ton emission permit cost
Emission amount 1,793 lb/MWh(=8.732 mmbtu/MWh *205.35 lb/mmbtu) 852 lb/MWh(=7.223 mmbtu/MWh *118.00 lb/mmbtu)
Emission price $0.0175/lb(=$35/ton divided by 2000 lb/ton) $0.0175/lb(=$35/ton divided by 2000 lb/ton)
Emission cost $31.38/MWh(=1,793 lb/MWh * $0.0175/lb) $14.92/MWh(=852 lb/MWh * $0.0175/lb)
Cost per MWh $71.81/MWh(=$40.43/MWh + $31.38/MWh) $68.63/MWh(=$53.71/MWh + $14.92/MWh)
* Contains capital costs and ﬁxed operation and management costs per calculation in PaciﬁCorp (2007).
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0.5403 and the term structure of volatility is backwardated; the year 1
correlation between the emission permit and electricity (natural gas)
is 0.4692 (0.1755) and the term structure of correlation is in contango.
As the commoditization of coal is very limited relative to that of natural
gas, it is assumed that a ﬁrm will purchase coal through a long-term
ﬁxed-price contract (i.e., coal volatility is assumed to be zero.).17
Finally, for robustness test purposes, we gather the scheduled
(maintenance) outage and the effective forced outage information.
According to PaciﬁCorp (2007), a maintenance outage of a coal (natural
gas) plant is 5% (7%) and an equivalent forced outage rate is about 5%
(5%). Hence,we use the availability factor of 90% (88%) for a coal (natural
gas) plant. The coal plant’s 90% comes from 100%− 5% (maintenance
outage) − 5% (equivalent forced outage), and the natural gas plant’s
88% is 100% − 7% (maintenance outage) − 5% (equivalent forced
outage).
4. Results
This section reports three sets of results from three analyses. First,
we calculate simple net present values of two projects: building a coal
plant and building a natural gas plant. Next, this section documents
ﬁndings from a simpliﬁed option analysis using compound exchange
options. Finally, we report and discuss the results of the LSMC, which
models a power plant investment decision as a compound American
option on multiple strips of spread options.
4.1. Net present value analysis
Consider an electric power utility company that evaluates three
alternatives: purchasing power from a wholesale market; building a
natural gas plant; or building a coal plant. The natural gas plant is
“greener” than the coal plant because the natural gas plant emits
118.00 lb of CO2 per mmbtu, whereas the coal plant emits 205.35 lb of
CO2 per mmbtu. Furthermore, the natural gas plant is about 17%
more fuel-efﬁcient than the coal plant. The heat rate of the natural
gas plant is 7.223 mmbtu/MWh, whereas the coal plant heat rate is
8.732 mmbtu/MWh. To generate 1 MWh of electric power, a natural
gas plant burns 7.223 mmbtu of fossil fuel, whereas a coal plant burns
8.732mmbtu. Finally, capital costswhen building a coal plant are higher17 Differently from the natural gas market where natural gas purchase prices are often
pegged to standardized indexes such as Gas Daily or IFERC, long-term (e.g., 30 years)
ﬁxed-price coal purchase contracts are very common in the coal market. First, coal in
the Powder River Basin and the Appalachian area is somewhat commoditized, but the
levels of standardization and liquidity are much lower than those of the natural gas. Sec-
ond, such long-term contracts are a means of covering ﬁxed costs of coal mines as well
as procuring stable long-term fuel for coal-ﬁred electricity generation plants. To represent
the long-term coal purchase agreement in our model, we choose to assume zero coal vol-
atility. However, our LSMC results do not critically depend on this zero coal volatility as-
sumption as we will discuss later.thanwhen building a natural gas plant. PaciﬁCorp (2007) calculates that
building a coal plant costs $2,479 per kilowatt, whereas building a
natural gas plant costs only $895 per kilowatt; a coal plant is about
three times as expensive as a natural gas plant with regards to the
amount of capital spending.
Table 2 summarizes the simple economics of each plant, “not
assuming” and “assuming” a CO2 permit cost. Observe in Panel A,
which does not assume a CO2 permit cost, that the total generation
cost of the natural gas plant is 1.3 times as expensive as that of the coal
plant, notwithstanding its superior “greenness” and fuel-efﬁciency. In
Panel B, which does assume a CO2 permit cost, observe that the relative
economics favorable to the coal plant deteriorates. According to
the preliminary analysis in this section, building and dispatching
the coal plant ($71.81/MWh) or the natural gas plant ($68.63/MWh)
is more expensive than purchasing electricity from the wholesale
market ($51.82/MWh). A net present value analysis would reject
both projects. This, however, would neglect the value of delaying the in-
vestment (seeMcDonald and Siegel, 1986), and the generationﬂexibility
of the power plant.
4.2. A simpliﬁed real option analysis using compound exchange options
To improve on the net present value analysis, we use real options
to evaluate the value of the investment opportunity. Starting with a
simpliﬁed model, we use a CEO to model the investment alternatives.
As we will discuss more in this section, the CEO premia of these two
investment opportunities reﬂect the expected positive future payoff
and suggest that both real options are economically valuable.
Consider a single dispatch decision made at time τS and a simple
exchange option (hereafter, SEO) with a payoff of SðτSÞ ≡max½EτS−H 
ðFτS þMPτS Þ;0. Furthermore, an investment decision is made at time
τC b τS and a CEO with a payoff of max[S(τS)− K, 0] expires at time τC
where K, a per MWh physical capital cost for building a plant, is the
strike price of the CEO. Using a bivariate geometric Brownian motion,
Carr (1988) proposes a closed-form solution for a CEO premium.
Adapting his solution, we calculate a CEO premium as
CEO ¼ E0N2 d1 YY ; τC
 
;d1 Y; τSð Þ
 
−H F0 þMP0ð ÞN2 d2 YY ; τC
 
;d2 Y ; τSð Þ
 
− KN1 d2
Y
Y
; τC
  
where Y ≡ E0HðF0þMP0Þ is the ratio between the electricity price and
the generation cost; σE is the electricity price volatility; σF is the
generation cost volatility; ρ is the correlation between these two; the
volatility ofY ≜ σ ≡
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2E þ σ2F−2ρσEσ F
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p ;N1ðÞ is the standard normal c.d.f.; N2(⋅) is the standard
bivariate normal c.d.f. with correlation
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
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q
; Y* is implicitly determined
Fig. 2. CEO premia. This ﬁgure reports the CEO premia of the coal plant and the natural
gas plant. From Table 1, the heat rate for the coal (natural gas) plant is 8.732 (7.233)
mmbtu/MWh. From Section 3, the electricity price = $51.82/MWh, the coal price =
$0.50/mmbtu, the natural gas price = $4.78/mmbtu, the electricity volatility = 0.59, the
natural gas volatility = 0.48, the coal volatility = 0, and the correlation between the
natural gas and electricity = 0.6386. Finally, from Table 3, the capital cost for the coal
(natural gas) plant is $36.06/MWh ($19.18/MWh). The X-axis (Y-axis) represents the
emission cost (the value of investment opportunities). The red (blue) curve represents
the coal (natural gas) plant. The right (left) end of each curve assumes the full $35/ton
(zero) emission cost.
20 The early exercise of Carr’s (1988) CEOmodelmay be optimal if the convenience yield
of electricity is greater than that of fuel. However, the convenience yield is not deﬁned for
electricity.
21
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simpliﬁed real option values of the coal plant and the natural gas
plant, we consider a decision that will be made one year from now;
that is, τC = 1. Because a typical plant’s useful life is 30 years, we
aggregate all dispatch decisions at a single time. Because of time value
of money, dispatch decisions in the initial years of production have
more impact than dispatch decision at the end of the life of the plant.
For this reason, we set τS − τC to be 12.6 years, which is an average
timeweighted by the time value of money (i.e., 15 years discounted).18
Fig. 2 depicts the value of two investment opportunities assuming a
range of emission costs. With zero emission cost, the value of a coal
plant investment opportunity ($17.87) is greater than that of a natural
gas plant investment opportunity ($17.46). In contrast, assuming full
emission cost of $35/ton, the value of a natural gas plant investment
opportunity ($14.51) is greater than that of a coal plant investment
opportunity ($12.22). Because the all-in cost ($71.81/MWh), including
both the physical capital and generation costs, is greater than the
electricity price ($51.82/MWh), the exercise value of the CEO is zero.
Hence, all of $12.22/MWh is the extrinsic value of the SEO and/or the
CEO. According to the same logic, the extrinsic value of a natural gas
plant investment opportunity is $14.51/MWh, which is more valuable
than that of a coal plant investment opportunity. Therefore, a rational
ﬁrm may change its resource choice depending on the emission cost.
Under the presence of the government credibility problem, the
relative economics will be between the right and left ends of the curve
depicted in Fig. 2. Therefore, the government credibility problem
decreases the degree to which the emission permit market encourages
ﬁrms to invest in a green resource. Speciﬁcally, if the emission price is
less than the break-even emission price of $2.12/ton, the natural gas
plant investment opportunity is less valuable than the coal plant invest-
ment opportunity.19
Carr’s (1988) model has posed several limitations in our study of
the effect of the government credibility problem on the power plant
investment decision:18 We produced results for τS− τC ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20} as robustness checks. These alterna-
tive choices of τS − τC change the break-even emission permit cost at which the natural
gas plant is as valuable as the coal plant, but the general conclusions are similar.
19 The break-even point is dependent on the initial parameter of the problem.• Because the dispatch decision is made only once during the life of
a plant, it fails to address the “strip” nature of a power plant as (3)
suggests.
• Strictly speaking, this simple CEO model does not directly address
the investment timing of three choices: (a) building a coal plant;
(b) building a natural gas plant; and (c) do nothing and wait.20
• Finally, it is difﬁcult to formally introduce variables to model the
government policy risk.
Because of these limitations, we use a more sophisticated model
using the LSMC method, and the next subsection presents the results.
Furthermore, we analyze the rich information that the LSMC method
provides including the investment timing, the value of waiting, the
investment choice, and the emission amount.4.3. Least squares Monte Carlo method results
Using the general input data summarized in Table 3, we present
various cases of the LSMC results created from criteria summarized in
Table 4. A base case is one in which the emission policy is not imple-
mented (R=0% in the ﬁrst row of Table 4) and the ﬁrm has generation
ﬂexibility. The base case is then compared to multiple alternatives.
Combining the different criteria mentioned in Table 4 leads to more
than 100 cases that we analyze.21 Table 5 and Figs. 3 to 6 report the
outcomes for a selected subset of results.
A government may consider the implementation of a carbon reduc-
tion policy (hereafter, named green policy). A cap-and-trademarket for
CO2 emission permitswill be created. Emitting CO2will incur costs. Two
scenarios are considered regarding the green policy implementation
(the second row of Table 4). In the ﬁrst scenario, the green policy is
implemented immediately. In the second scenario, the green policy is
planned immediately (2014), but implemented in the future (2020).
For the second scenario, we also consider cases where industries
affected by the green policy and their lobbyists have a chance to block
the policy before its implementation (i.e., R b 100% in the ﬁrst row of
Table 4). This creates additional uncertainty as to future cash ﬂows.
Once the policy is implemented, the governmentmay beunder pressure
to increase the supply of emission permits. A credible government
will not submit to the pressure. The green policy will stay intact and
the market operation will dictate the price of the emission permits.
A less credible government may submit to the pressure. The govern-
ment then increases the cap of permits, effectively reducing the
cost of emission permits. Different levels of credibility (CRED ∈
{10, 000; 10; 2; 1; 0.25; 0.1} in the third row of Table 4) are considered
in our analysis.
Once built, two scenarios are considered regarding the decision to
generate electricity or not. In the ﬁrst scenario, the plant has generation
ﬂexibility (I=1 in the fourth row of Table 4).When the electricity price
on the wholesale market is higher than the cost of generation, the
power plant will be dispatched and electricity will be generated.
When the electricity price is lower than the generating costs, the
power plant can be suspended. In the second scenario, the plant has
no generation ﬂexibility (I = 0 in the fourth row of Table 4). Thus,
the power plant is always producing, even when conditions are not
favorable, and electricity is generated at a loss.The values of CRED of 10,000, 10, 2, 1, 0.25, and 0.1 in Table 4 can be translated to
0.00%, 0.00%, 2.28%, 15.87%, 40.13%, and 46.02% probabilities, respectively, that the govern-
ment will increase the number of permits for the next year. These can be also translated to
0.00, 0.05, 1.22, 2.24, 4.14, and 4.76 government submissions over a period of 30 years on
average. Here, we use 10,000 as our proxy for + ∞ in order to make sure the probability
and the expected number of submission are all zeroes.
Table 3
General inputs to LSMC analysis. This table summarizes the input parameters of our LSMC analyses documented in Subsection 4.3. The initial electricity and fuel forward curves, their term
structures of volatilities, and their term structure correlations are calculated from ﬁve years of historical SP15 electricity spot and forward prices and Henry Hub spot and forward prices
from 2008 to 2013 (from Bloomberg). Using insights from Ayres andWalter (1991) and PaciﬁCorp (2007), we use $35/ton as the initial emission permit price. To calculate the term struc-
ture of volatilities and correlations associated with emission permit prices, we use European data (EU-ETS, German electricity prices and Netherland natural gas prices from Bloomberg)
because U.S. nationwide emission permit trading has yet to begin.
Category Parameter Value
Economic Interest rate 4% ﬂat term structure
Commodity prices Electricity forward curve ($/MWh) $51.8195/MWh in year 1, indexed by interest rate
Coal forward curve ($/mmbtu) $0.50/mmbtu in year 1, indexed by interest rate
Natural gas forward curve ($/mmbtu) $4.7806/mmbtu in year 1, indexed by interest rate
Emission permit Prices $35 in year 1, indexed by interest rate
Plant specs Coal heat rate 8.732 mmbtu/MWh
Coal CO2 emission 205.35 lb/mmbtu
Coal capital cost $36.06/MWh
Natural gas heat rate 7.223 mmbtu/MWh
Natural gas CO2 emission 118.00 lb/mmbtu
Natural gas capital cost $19.18/MWh
Volatility term structure Electricity 58.62% in year 1 and in backwardation (4.26% in year 30)
Natural gas 47.90% in year 1 and in backwardation (5.83% in year 30)
Emission permit prices 54.03% in year 1 and in backwardation (6.72% in year 30)
Correlation term structure Electricity—Natural gas 63.86% in year 1 and in contango (89.99% in year 30)
Electricity—Permit price 46.92% in year 1 and in contango (85.65% in year 30)
Natural gas—Permit price 17.55% in year 1 and in contango (78.12% in year 30)
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resource choice, investment timing, and consumption—as the ﬁrst col-
umn suggests. Resource choice reports the percentage of simulation
paths that chooses an investment in the coal-ﬁred plant, an investment
in the natural gas-ﬁred plant, and no investment for the next 30 years.
Investment timing area contains the average wait time in years before
making an investment decision. Consumption area has the averages of
CO2 emissions, coal consumption, and NG consumption. The simulation
of 10,000 paths is repeated to provide statistical precision; 10 repeti-
tions produce standard errors which are sufﬁciently small relative to
the numbers presented in Table 5.22
Base case A in Table 5 is the case where there is no carbon policy in
place and the plant has generation ﬂexibility. The results show that the
coal-ﬁred plant is chosen in the vast majority of the simulated paths
(97.22%), leaving a negligible proportion of paths where the natural
gas-ﬁred plant would be preferred (2.79%). These results are consistent
with the ﬁndings in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2; namely, that in the absence
of a carbon policy, the coal plant is a more attractive investment than
the natural gas plant. In addition, theﬁrmwill decide to invest relatively
soon (in 1.33 years on average) because the value of waiting is small
when one alternative is obviously better than the other. It comes as no
surprise that coal is consumed signiﬁcantly more than natural gas
(251.4 mmbtu for coal compared to 4.9 mmbtu for natural gas).23 Hav-
ing amajority of coal-ﬁred plants producesmore pollution (the average
CO2 emission= 52,206 lb) than other cases that will be comparedwith
base case A.
Now we are in a position to discuss the effect of the CO2 emission
permit market implementation on resource choice, CO2 emission, and
investment timing. Cases C, D, I, and J show the results when the carbon
reduction scheme is implemented immediately (in year 2014). Among
these cases, cases C and D show the results with generation ﬂexibility,
while cases I and J show the resultswithout. Cases C and I display the re-
sultswhen the government credibility is high (CRED=10, 000),where-
as cases D and J illustrate the results of when the government has
credibility issues (CRED=1). Implementing the carbon policy immedi-
ately does affect the decision of the ﬁrms: In cases C, D, I, and J, the22 For example, case G has the standard error of 0.04% (% coal), 0.05% (% NG), 0.04% (% no
plant), and 0.005 (investment timing), which are relatively small for their sample means.
23 Case B is the same as case A, except that the power plant must always be dispatched.
Results are very similar to case A because the simulation setup is very favorable to a coal-
ﬁred power plant, and very few paths produce situations where not dispatching the plant
would be preferable. Caseswhere theﬂexibility does have signiﬁcant impact are discussed
below.natural gas-ﬁred plant is preferred over the coal plant with proportions
of 98.11%, 95.22%, 95.88%, and 92.45%, respectively. These results are
consistent with the ﬁndings in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2; namely, that
in the presence of a carbon policy, the natural gas plant is a more prof-
itable investment opportunity than the coal-ﬁred plant. Observe that
for all the aforementioned cases, CO2 emission is signiﬁcantly reduced.
Case C shows that the ﬁrms will delay their investment (2.21 years)
more than in base case A (1.33 years). The interpretation is as follows:
emission costs make investment in a new thermal plant less proﬁtable,
and the additional uncertainty coming from the stochastic emission
permit price further increase the value of waiting.
Let us discuss the effect of government credibility risk on investment
timing and resource choice. In case D, the government has credibility is-
sues (CRED = 1), and the pressure on the government may lead to
softer carbon reduction goals.24 The investment is delayed from
2.21 years in case C to 2.66 years in case D. The increase in variability
of the cash ﬂow caused by the credibility issues increases the value of
waiting and the average time to investment. On the other hand, the
reduced expected emission costs caused by the government adding
new emission permits decrease both value of waiting and time to
investment. In case D, and in most of the other cases, the former effect
dominates the latter effect. Likewise, in cases I and J, which assume
that the ﬁrms must dispatch the power plant once it is built (I = 0), a
delay in the investment timing from 2.83 years (case I) to 3.40 years
(case J) is observed in the presence of the government credibility prob-
lem. Such ﬁndings are robust to various combinations of electricity and
fuel prices, as Fig. 4 depicts the investment timings for high (CRED =
10, 000) andmoderate (CRED=1) given the various natural gas prices.
Referring back to Table 5, in the presence of the government credibility
problem, the proportion of coal-ﬁred plants increases from 1.89%
(case C) and 4.12% (case I) to 4.78% (case D) and 7.55% (case J). The
government credibility problem does mitigate the effectiveness of the
carbon reduction policy.
We now turn our attention to cases I and J, which do not have
dispatch optionality. Observe that the absence of dispatch optionality
increases investment timing from 2.21 years (case C) and 2.66 years
(case D) to 2.83 years (case I) and 3.40 years (case J). If there is no
generation ﬂexibility, an agent needs to gather additional information
before making an irreversible investment decision, and therefore the
investment timing increases. In addition, a plant for which generation24 When the pressure level hits the speciﬁed barrier, the emission permit price is reset to
its original value indexed by the interest rate.
Table 4
LSMC cases criteria. This table shows the criteria we use to create scenarios for our LSMC
simulation. Combining the criteria and eliminating the redundant cases leads to 100differ-
ent cases. In Table 5, we report numerical results of a selected representative subset.
Criteria Values
Probability to implement the carbon reduction
scheme (R) with an initial permit price of
$0.0175/lb indexed by the interest rate
R ∈ { 0%, 10%, 20%,…, 100% }
Implementation year Now (2014) Future (2020)
Government credibility
CRED ∈
High
10,000
10 2 Med
1
0.25 0.1
Power generation ﬂexibility Yes No
(to dispatch or not to dispatch the power plant) I= 1 I= 0
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delaying the optimal investment timing
Next, we study the effect of planning the adoption of a carbon reduc-
tion scheme in six years (2020) in cases E, F, G, and H. These cases are
particularly interesting because Wilson et al. (2012) predict that the
federal-level cap-and-trade system may be implemented by around
2020. All four cases show results when the ﬁrms have generation ﬂexi-
bility (I=1). Cases E and F show the results when the carbon reduction
policy is implemented with certainty (R= 100 %), while cases G and H
show the cases in which there is a 50% probability the policy is reversed
before being implemented (R= 50 %). Finally, cases E and G show the
results of a credible government (CRED = 10, 000), while cases F and
H show the results when the government has some credibility issues
(CRED = 1). Implementing a carbon reduction scheme does delay the
investment for all four cases when compared to base case A. However,
implementing the scheme in 2020 does hasten the investment when
cases E (1.96 years) and F (2.35 years) are compared to cases C (2.21
years) and D (2.66 years). When the policy is planned for year 2020,
ﬁrms can proﬁt from the ﬁrst six years without having to pay for their
CO2 emissions. Moreover, introducing credibility issues also mitigates
the carbon reduction scheme effect when comparing case F to case E,
and case H to case G.
Let us analyze the effect of uncertain implementation in 2020 on
investment timing and resource choice: The results of cases G and H
with R = 50 % are signiﬁcantly different from the other cases. When
these are compared to base case A, we observe that the additional
uncertainty of whether the policy will be implemented does increase
the variability of the cash ﬂows and delays the optimal investment
time. Surprisingly, when cases G and H are compared to cases E and F,
the investment is actually hastened; in the state of the world where
the policy is not implemented, cash ﬂows are more positive, and
outweigh the additional variance in the cash ﬂows. This explains why
the additional uncertainty does produce faster investments. Interestingly,Table 5
Output of LSMC simulation. This table summarizes the LSMC simulation results of 10 iterations o
resource choice, reports the percentage of simulation paths which chooses investment in the co
years. The third area, investment timing, has the average wait time before making an investm
consumption, and NG consumption.
Cases code A B C
Case specs. Probability of a successful implantation
of a cap-and-trade system (R =)
0% 0% 1
Implementation year Never Never 2
Government credibility (CRED=) – – 1
Flexibility to dispatch Yes No Y
Resource choice % Coal 97.22% 97.26% 1
% NG 2.79% 2.74% 9
% No plant 0.00% 0.00% 0
Investment timing Investment timing (years) 1.33 1.33 2
Consumption CO2 emission (lb) 52,206 52,220 1
Coal consumption (mmbtu) 251.4 251.5 3
NG consumption (mmbtu) 4.9 4.9 1this also indicates that when the nature of a strip of European options in
(3) is appropriately considered for investment decision as in (4) and (5),
Yang et al. (2008) and Fuss et al.’s (2008)ﬁndings ofwaiting until the un-
certainty is resolvedmay not be always true. Observe that the proportion
of coal-ﬁred plants is signiﬁcantly increased in cases G (49.59%) and H
(51.34%) compared to cases E (1.83%) and F (4.65%). The uncertainty of
the implementation of a permit program does mitigate the effectiveness
of their carbon reduction scheme. However, it is signiﬁcantly lowerwhen
compared to base case A (97.22%).
The general conclusions in Table 5 stay the same in our robustness
test using 10% annualized coal volatility. In other words, the results
are not driven by zero coal volatility. We do not report the results to
manage the size of this paper. Furthermore, according to unreported
results, the general conclusions in Table 5 do not change even after
including availability factors in our LSMC simulation. As an availability
factor, we use 90% (88%) for a coal (natural gas) plant that we gather
from PaciﬁCorp (2007).
In order to further investigate the effect of uncertainty regarding the
implementation of the policy in 2020 on the real option decisions, we
calculate the real option for various combinations of generation ﬂexibil-
ity (I ∈ {0, 1}), government credibility (CRED ∈ {1; 10, 000}), and the
probability of policy implementation in 2020 (R ∈ {0 %, 10 %, 20 %,…,
100 %}). Fig. 5 shows the results: Panel a (b) shows the time to invest
(% value of waiting) as a function of the probability to implement the
policy in 2020. The expected cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm are best when
there is no policy (R = 0 %) because this is the scenario in which the
ﬁrms make the highest proﬁt. The expected cash ﬂows are the worst
when the policy is implemented with certainty (R = 100 %) because
of the emission costs. The cashﬂow variance induced by the uncertainty
of implementation is minimal when there is no uncertainty about the
future implementation (R = 100 % or R = 0 %), but is highest when
the probability of implementing is 50% (R = 50 %). Fig. 5b shows that
as the probability of implementing the policy in 2020 increases, the per-
cent value of waiting increases for all four scenarios of CRED and
generation ﬂexibility. This increase in the value of waiting comes from
the increase in the variability of the cash ﬂows and the decrease in
potential future cash ﬂows. However, as the future implementation
becomes certain (R→ 100 %), a ﬁrm has less reason to wait until 2020,
thus decreasing the average time to investment. This explains the
dipping slope observed in Fig. 5a.
Fig. 5a illustrates a case where an increase in uncertainty (when R
goes from 100% to 50 %) ﬁrst delays the investment but then eventually
hastens the investment. To illustrate that government uncertainty due
to credibility issues can also cause a similar phenomenon, Fig. 6 reports
cases in which the policy is planned for the year 2020, the ﬁrm has
generation ﬂexibility (I=1), the probability of implementing the policy
goes from0% to 100% (R∈ {0 %, 10 %, 20 %,…, 100 %}), and the credibility
of the government goes from very credible to totally unreliablef 10,000 paths. The ﬁrst area, labeled as case specs, deﬁnes each scenario. The second area,
al-ﬁred plant, investment in the natural gas-ﬁred plant, and no investment for the next 30
ent decision. The fourth area, consumption, reports the averages of CO2 emission, coal
D E F G H I J
00% 100% 100% 100% 50% 50% 100% 100%
014 2014 2020 2020 2020 2020 2014 2014
0,000 1 10,000 1 10,000 1 10,000 1
es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
.89% 4.78% 1.83% 4.65% 49.59% 51.34% 4.12% 7.55%
8.11% 95.22% 98.17% 95.35% 50.41% 48.67% 95.88% 92.45%
.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
.21 2.66 1.96 2.35 1.85 2.10 2.83 3.40
3,259 15,623 14,526 16,747 33,205 34,338 13,575 16,046
.4 9.4 3.4 9.6 127.2 130.8 7.3 14.4
06.4 116.0 117.2 125.3 60.0 63.4 102.4 110.9
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Fig. 3.Government credibility effect. This ﬁgure presents the effect of government credibility on investment timing. The cases are similar to case C and case D. The carbon reduction scheme
is implemented immediately (in 2014) and the plants have generation ﬂexibility. The credibility of the government varies: CRED ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 1, 2, 10}, where CRED is used in (6). Panel a
(b) shows the investment timing in years (%value of waiting) as a function of CRED. (%value of waiting = [option value− exercise value]/option value).
105S.B. Kang, P. Létourneau / Energy Economics 54 (2016) 96–107(CRED ∈ {10, 000; 2; 1; 0.1}). Again, the expected cash ﬂows are best
when there is no policy (R = 0 %) and the worst when the policy is
implemented with certainty (R= 100 %). On the other hand, the cash
ﬂow variance decreases as there is less uncertainty about the future
implementation of the policy. Furthermore, as the government is less
credible, the cash ﬂows becomemore volatile, but there are more states
of the world where cash ﬂows are more positive. Recall ﬁndings from
Table 5 and Figs. 3, 4, and 5 that as CRED decreases, the effect of increas-
ing the variance of the cash ﬂows dominates the effect of increasing the
number of states of world where the cash ﬂows are more positive.
Nonetheless, we were able to produce a scenario where decreasing
CREDwould hasten the average time to invest. To achieve that, wemod-
ify the reaction of the government to political pressure, such that the
emission permit prices are now divided by 10 when the government
submits to political pressure. Fig. 6 provides that when the credibility
decreases from CRED= 10, 000 to CRED= 2, the increase in variance
dominates and the investment is delayed. However, as the credibility
further declines to CRED = 0.1, the effect of the more positive cash
ﬂows dominates, and the investment is hastened.a
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Fig. 4. Investment timing with respect to initial NG price. This ﬁgure shows the average investm
The carbon reduction scheme is implemented immediately (in 2014) and the plants have gen
$6.6928/mmbtu. The solid blue line represents the case of credible government (CRED= 10,00
credibility (CRED= 1). Panel a (b) shows the investment timing in years (%value of waiting) a5. Discussion and conclusion
To study the effect of political uncertainty related to a CO2 permit
market on thermal plant investment decisions, we perform the LSMC
method to evaluate an American compound option on strips of
European spread options, and gather information on investment timing,
resource choice, fuel consumption, and CO2 emission. The following is a
summary of the numerical results:
First, the government credibility problem generally decreases the
degree to which an emission reduction scheme encourages a green
resource, and delays investment, as Figs. 3, 4, and 5 illustrate.
Second, the absence of dispatch optionality further delays investment
because an agent needs to gather additional information before making
an irreversible investment decision. Hence,we claim that not considering
dispatch optionality may result in an inaccurate investment decision.
Third, relative to the immediate implementation of an emission
market in 2014, deterministic (“for-sure”) implementation in 2020
hastens investment because an agent may beneﬁt from running the
“less green” plant before 2020 without paying for CO2 emission costs.b
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Fig. 5. Combined effect of implementation risk and government credibility. This ﬁgure
shows the combined effect of implementation risk and government credibility on the
investment timing when the implementation is planned for 2020. The solid (dotted)
lines identify the cases with (without) generation ﬂexibility. The circle (square) markers
identify the case with high (moderate) credibility. The investment timing is the average
of 10 repetitions of simulation of 10,000 paths. With a probability of implementing the
green policy in 2020 of 0% or 100%, the variance of the cash ﬂow is minimal, whereas it
is maximal when the probability of implementing the green policy in 2020 is 50%.
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Fig. 6. Combined effect of implementation risk and government credibility. This ﬁgure
shows the combined effect of implementation risk and government credibility on the
investment timing when the implementation is planned for 2020. The plants can
be dispatched or not. The solid blue line represents the case of credible government
(CRED= 10, 000), the long-dashed green line represents the case where the government
has CRED= 2, the short-dashed red line represents the case where the government has
moderate credibility (CRED= 1), and the dotted blue line represents the case where the
government has low credibility (CRED = 0.1). The investment timing is the average of
10 repetitions of simulation of 10,000 paths.
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uncertain implementation in 2020 with around 80% probability delays
investment. Furthermore, such uncertainty decreases the degree to
which the emission permit market will discourage investment in a
coal plant.
Fifth, the government credibility problem has two potential ef-
fects. On the one hand, it increases uncertainty about future cash
ﬂows of ﬁrms, effectively increasing the variance of the cash ﬂow, in-
creasing the value of waiting, and delaying investment in a new elec-
tric power plant. The effect on the variance of future cash ﬂow is well
known and documented. On the other hand, lowering the expected
emission permit price increases future cash ﬂows. More positive
cash ﬂows hasten investment into a new power plant, as Fig. 6 de-
picts. This positive effect on themean of future cash ﬂows is not pres-
ent in the literature, and constitutes a contribution to the body of
literature on real options.
This paper has implications to policy makers and governments.
When a government announces a future implementation of a CO2 cap-
and-trade system, it should send two signals: First, the government
should show its commitment that themarket will in fact be implement-
ed by the announced implementation date. Second, the government
should persuade potential market participants that it is credible and
will not submit to political pressure to increase the amount of the
permits. Private ﬁrms’ expectations of these policy risks will mitigate
the degree that a green policy encourages a green investment.A practitioner in the private sector may use our approaches for
capital investment and other strategic emission mitigation decision-
making (Aggarwal and Dow, 2012) by comparing several government
credibility scenarios as we do in this paper. In addition, we learn from
our research that a private ﬁrm should consider the effect of generation
or production ﬂexibility in its analysis in order to make an accurate
physical capital investment decision.
The current research opens new opportunities for future research
because our approach may be applicable not only to an electric power
plant investment decision but also to other decisions in energy econom-
ics and ﬁnance, as the belief of rational ﬁrms about a policy risk or time-
consistency problem may prevent a government from achieving its
policy goal. As long as a researcher can calculate prices and volatilities
of the downstream product (e.g., electricity) and the upstream product
(e.g., natural gas) of a physical capital asset (e.g., an electric power
plant), the researcher can apply our approach to his/her problem. ■Appendix A. Forward curve simulation
Because a rationalﬁrmmakes an irreversible investment decision by
evaluating (5), which requires information of commodity prices later
than the time of investment decision, we model the evolution of
whole forward curves, as opposed to a spot price, of electricity, fuel
and emission permit prices over time. Tomodel forward price evolution
relevant to pricing of long-term base-load assets, we use a forward
evolution model which can capture the term-structure of volatility,
the term-structure of correlation, contango/backwardation, and the
long-term growth rate equal to an interest rate. Speciﬁcally, we use
107S.B. Kang, P. Létourneau / Energy Economics 54 (2016) 96–107continuous time stochastic processes of electricity forward prices, fuel
forward prices, and emission permit prices at time t as
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where t represents a trading time; T ' represents a delivery time of a
commodity; σEτ0 , σ
F
τ0 ; and σ
P
τ0 is a forward instantaneous volatility
with a tenor τ ' of electricity fuel and emission permit, respectively; ZEτ0
ðtÞ , Z Fτ0 ðtÞ and ZPτ0 ðtÞ are correlated Brownian motions representing
various factors related to the supply and demand of electricity, fuel
and emission permit prices;ρE; Fτ0 ,ρ
E;P
τ0 , andρ
F;P
τ0 is a forward instantaneous
correlation with a tenor τ ' between an electricity price and a fuel price,
between an electricity price and an emission permit price, and between
a fuel price and an emission permit price, respectively; W1(t), W2(t),
and W3(t) are independent Brownian motions.
In (A.1), all forward electricity prices move upward or downward
together stochastically over time, as Fig. 1 depicts. When we perturb a
whole forward curve, we do not change spot prices which have already
realized, i.e., at time t we perturb Si(t, T ’) only for T ’ N t.
For a simpliﬁed example, consider a term structure of electricity
price with only 2 years. At t = 0, we have SE(0, 0) for the spot price,
SE(0, 1) for the 1-year forward price, and SE(0, 2) for the 2-year forward
price. Let the initial term structure increase by a continuously
compounded interest rate, e.g., SE(0, 1) = SE(0, 0) × er × 1. Going from
t = 0 to t = 1, we perturb SE(0, 1) and SE(0, 2), which then become
SE(1, 1) and SE(1, 2), the spot price and the 1-year forward price at
t = 1, respectively. Effectively, the spot price has an expected growth
rate equal to the one implied by the initial term structure.
On the other hand, we set the initial forward curve to increase at a
continuously compounded interest rate as Table 3 and Fig. 1 exhibit,
because our paper concerns investment in physical capital assets, the
useful life of which is several decades. Hence the long-term growth
rate of resources in our model is an interest rate.
The greater theρE;Fτ0 , themore likely it will be that electricity forward
prices move in the same direction as fuel prices. As σEτ0 and σ
E
τ0 are a
function of τ ', the term structure of volatility can be incorporated into
(A.1). A typical pattern of σEτ0 and σ
F
τ0 is decreasing in τ '.
25 Speciﬁcally,
if σEτ0 and σ
F
τ0 is a decreasing exponential function, it is identical to the
model by Schwartz (1997). The correlation between an electricity
price (a fuel price) and an emission permit price is explicitly incorporat-
ed intoρE;P
τ0
(ρF;P
τ0
Þ. This is an important feature because it is plausible that
the higher the electricity forward price is, the higher the political pres-
sure (PRES)will be on a government. Fig. 1 depicts the positive and neg-
ative one standard deviation of perturbation in the forward curve.
Observe that with these volatility and correlation functions, successive
upward (downward) movements lead to backwardation (contango).
Finally, in our implementation of (A.1), the granularity of our LSMC
simulation is annual because the quantity of emission and emission
permits are accounted annually, and this paper studies the value of
base-load assets with 30 years of useful life. Under such granularity,the term structure of volatilities in electricity and natural gas forward prices, see,
e.g., Kang et al. (2005).the hourly and monthly seasonality, short-term mean reversion, a
temporary jump, etc., are irrelevant.
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